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III.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction of this
matter pursuant to the provisions of § 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code
Ann. (1953, as amended) and Rules 3(a) and 4 of Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
I \i

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court's failure to grant

appellant/defendant's Motion for Continuance was inappropriate?
The standard of review for determining whether to grant a
continuance is the "abuse of discretion" standard by acting
unreasonable.

Batty v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah

1978).
II.

Whether trial courtfs statements concerning possible

repercussions resulting from appellant/defendant's decision to
depose witnesses was improper and precluded appellant/defendant
from deposing witnesses?

Rulings of questions of law by the

trial court will be reviewed by I*1IP appellate court for
correctness and accord them no particular deference. Mountain
Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah
1988).
III.

Whether the trial court's decision not to admit

appellant!s documentary evidence of work performed by both
parties to the contract was improper?

The trial court's

determination as to admissibility will not be upset absent an

1

abuse of discretion.

Marshall v. Van Geruen, 790 P.2d 62 (Utah

Ct.App. 1990) .
IV.

Whether the trial court's theory and grounds for

determining whether appellant terminated the contract between the
parties was proper?

The trial court's interpretation of a

contract is not entitled to any particular weight on appeal,
where the court interprets contract as matter of law without
regard for extrinsic evidence*

Baker v. Western Sur. Co., 757

P.2d 878 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).
V.

Whether the findings of fact drafted by appellee

accurately reflected the trial court's findings?

The trial

court's findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless
they "are against the clear weight of the evidence", or if the
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite or firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193

(Utah 1987).
V.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following rules are applicable to the issues on appeal.
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable
that it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of the
2

state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or
by other rules applicable in courts of this
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
Rule 804(b)(5), Utah Rules of Evidence:
A statement not specifically covered by any
of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness [will not be excluded] if the
court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.
Rule 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Upon motion of a party, the court may in its
discretion , and upon such terms as may be
just, including the payment of costs
occasioned by such postponement, postpone a
trial or proceeding upon good cause shown.
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall find the facts specially (sic) and
state separately its conclusions of law
thereon ...
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous ...
VI.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the judgment granted by the Third

3

Circuit Court, Summit County, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston
presiding.
contract.

Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of service
Parties entered into an agreement, partly written and

partly oral, for plaintiff to perform interior design work on
defendant's home.

Plaintiff's work was unsatisfactory and

defendant terminated the contract before the work had been
substantially completed.

Appellant contends that he was not

given sufficient time to prepare his defense and was not given a
fair trial. Appellant maintains that the following acts by the
trial court prevented a fair trial:
a.

Defendant's Motion for Continuance was granted for

either one week after the trial date (when defendant was to be
out of town), or granted for the same day the trial date was
previously set.

The trial was held on the date of the original

trial date set.
b.

Defendant was told by the trial judge that

depositions might result in an attorneys' fees judgment against
the defendant regardless of whether there was in fact an
attorneys' fee provision.
c.

The trial court did not allow admission of

relevant evidence relating to the amount of work addressed in the
contract by either party.
<3L.

The trial court found that plaintiff substantially

completed the interior design work and therefore the total design
fee of $8,000 was due to plaintiff, minus the amount that
defendant had already paid towards satisfaction of this amount.

4

e.

The trial court found that the type of contract

entered into by the parties was not terminated by defendant;
defendants1 attempt to terminate the contract was not sufficient
to warrant such termination.
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court
On February 10, 1993, this matter came before the Third
Circuit Court, Summit County, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston
presiding, for trial.

The plaintiff was present and represented

by her counsel, Brent A. Gold.

The defendant was present and

represented himself as a Pro Se defendant.
The trial court found that the plaintiff substantially
completed the interior design work and thereby the total design
fee of $8,000.00 was due to plaintiff, minus the amount that the
defendant had already paid plaintiff towards satisfaction of this
amount.

A judgment was entered on March 17, 1993, against

defendant in the amount of $2,000.00 for design fees owed to the
plaintiff.
merits.

The defendant's counterclaims were dismissed upon the

Notice of Appeal was filed on April 12, 1993.

VII.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
WAS UNREASONABLE.
It is well established that the trial court judge has the
discretion to grant or deny motions for continuance and will not
be reversed by the appellate court unless it is clear that the

5

court has abused its discretion by acting unreasonable*

Hunt v.

Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990).
In the case at bar, the appellant was not given a reasonable
amount of notice regarding the trial date.

Consequently, the

appellant filed a motion for continuance which was granted, but
was, in effect, a denial when the court offered a one week
continuance on a date that appellant could not attend trial and
the same date of February 10, 1993, that was previously the trial
date set.

Such conduct by the trial court judge was an abuse of

discretion by not providing appellant reasonable alternative
dates to continue the trial.

II. THE TRIAL COURT'S STATEMENTS REGARDING SANCTIONS WERE
INAPPROPRIATE AND PRECLUDED DEPOSING APPELLEE.
The trial court judge's lengthy, condescending statements
and personal views as to the validity of taking the deposition of
the appellee were inappropriate and, in effect, coerced appellant
into not deposing appellee by threatening attorneys fees and
costs against appellant.

The trial court judge created an

atmosphere of intimidation and inhibition in the courtroom and in
effect denied appellant his fundamental due process right of
having adequate time to prepare his defense through adequate
discovery.
III. REFUSAL TO ADMIT RELEVANT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE REGARDING
WORK PERFORMED TINDER THE AGREEMENT WAS ABUSE OF TRIAL COURT'S
DISCRETION.
The trial court abused its discretion by not admitting

6

relevant extrinsic evidence offered by appellant at trial.
Appellant offered extrinsic evidence that went to the very issue
of substantial performance regarding the contract between the
parties.

Appellant offered into evidence documents that were

prepared by Susan St. James which evidenced invoicing, billing
dates, check numbers, dates of payments, room-by-room breakdowns
of who actually located furnishings, and who actually arranged
for the purchase of the furnishings.

Unfortunately, due to

technical malfunction of the recording equipment, Susan St.
James1 testimony, appellant's motion to enter such evidence and
his objections, appellee's attorney's objections to
admissibility, and the courts denial of admission were not
recorded and did not become part of the transcript.

IV. and V, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in
all actions tried on the merits without a jury, the court shall
find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions
of law.

In order to determine whether the evidence adduced at

trial supports the trial court's findings, the findings must
provide sufficient detail and include facts to clearly show the
evidence upon which they were grounded.
P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991).

Woodward v. Fazzio. 823

The failure to enter adequate

findings of fact to support material issues may be reversible
error.

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah

1989) .
7

In the case at bar, the trial court's findings that the
appellee substantially performed her obligations under the
contract are not supported with sufficient specificity and
adequate evidentiary support.

In addition, the trial court

interpreted the contract between the parties based solely on
appellee's extrinsic evidence and did not admit relevant
extrinsic evidence that went to the issue of substantial
performance offered by the appellant.

Therefore, the trial

court's findings were not adequately supported by the evidence
and do not accurately reflect the trial court's findings.

VIII •
ARGUMENT
I, THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
WAS UNREASONABLE.
The issue is whether the trial court's denial of appellant's
Motion for a Continuance was unreasonable such that it was an
abuse of discretion.

Batty v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040, 1043

(Utah 1978) .
Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides the
trial courts with substantial discretion in deciding whether to
grant continuances "upon good cause shown."

Utah R. Civ. P.

40(b) (1953 as amended 1987); Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 (Utah
1990); Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1988);
Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 311 (Utah App. 1992); Hardy v.
Hardy. 776 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1989).

It is also well

established that the trial judge's decision will not be reversed
8

by the appellate court unless it is clear that the court has
abused that discretion by acting unreasonably.

Id.

In determining whether to grant continuances, the court
should examine the reasonableness of a request in light of the
tradition that a party should be afforded every reasonable
opportunity to be in attendance at his trial.

Bairas v. Johnson,

13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375, 378 (1962); see Gonzales v. Harris.
542 P.2d 842, 843-44 (Colo, 1975).

The trial court should not

prejudice the substantial rights of a party by forcing him to go
to trial without being able to fairly present his case solely
because of the court's legitimate concern for the prevention of
delay in the trial of cases. Gonzales v. Harris, 542 P.2d at
844; Yates v. Superior Court In and For City of Pima, 120 Ariz.
436, 586 P.2d 997, 998 (Ariz. App. 1978).

"One of the most

important ingredients of due process is the time to prepare a
defense."

Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983).

Appellant contends that he was not given a reasonable amount
of notice regarding the trial date.

Notice of the trial hearing

was not received by appellant until after the trial date was
already set, due to the fact that he was out of the state
conducting business at that time. As soon as he was notified of
the trial date he filed his Motion for Request of Discovery and
Motion for Continuance.
It is appellant's contention that the trial court's offer of
a one week continuance beyond the original trial date was, in
effect, a denial of the Motion for a Continuance and was

9

unreasonable under the particular circumstances of this case.
Appellant, because of previously scheduled business obligations,
would be out of the state of Utah on the only offered date of
February 17, 1993.

Thus, appellant was not given an actual

choice or afforded another date, but was limited to the original
trial date of February 10, 1993.

The trial court's failure to

grant a continuance resulted in denying appellant sufficient time
to perform discovery and adequately prepare his defense.
Due to the fact that the trial court did not establish any
cut-off date for discovery, appellant, as a pro se defendant1,
did not have a time table to determine when discovery was to be
completed in this case.

For that reason, during the five (5)

months that expired between the time appellant answered
appellee's complaint until the filing of his Motion for
Continuance, he did not commence discovery in the expectation
that the court would give him, a pro se defendant, some notice as
to the discovery cut-off date.

In addition, appellant was hoping

in good faith to settle the matter before it ever went to trial.
Under these particular circumstances, the trial court's
denial of appellant's Motion for a Continuance was unreasonable
and inconsistent with substantial justice and, therefore, was an

x

. Courts, as a general rule, have held that a party who
represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge
and practice as any qualified member of the bar. Nelson v.
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983). However, The Utah
Supreme Court has cautioned that "because of his lack of
technical knowledge of law and procedure [a layman acting as his
own attorney] should be accorded every consideration that may
reasonably be indulged." Id. (quoting Heathman v. Hatch. 13 Utah
2d 266, 268, 372 P.2d 990, 991 (1962).
10

abuse of its discretion.

II. THE TRIAL COURT'S STATEMENTS REGARDING SANCTIONS WERE
INAPPROPRIATE AND PRECLUDED DEPOSING APPELLEE.
The issue is whether the trial court!s statements concerning
possible repercussions resulting from appellant's decision to
depose witnesses was improper and precluded appellant from
deposing witnesses.
Appellant contends that the trial judge's lengthy and
condescending statements and personal views as to the validity of
taking the deposition of the appellee in a $3,000 collections
case were inappropriate and ultimately denied him the fundamental
legal right to depose the appellee/plaintiff in this case, and
thereby, denied him access to discoverable information to help
him adequately prepare for trial.
"One of the fundamental principles of due process is that
all parties to a case are entitled to an unbiased, impartial
judge.

V

A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement

of due process.1"

Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 839 P.2d 874,

877 (Utah App. 1992)(quoting Anderson v. Industrial Com'n of
Utah, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985)); see Bunnell v. Industrial
Com'n of Utah, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1987).

"Fairness

requires not only an absence of actual bias, but endeavors to
prevent even the possibility of unfairness."

Id.

"The right to

an impartial judge embraces a defendant's right to present and
conduct his own defense unhampered by the judge's idea of what
that defense should be or how it should proceed."
11

State v.

Rhodes, 224 S.E.2d 631, 638 (N.C. 1976).
The Court's review of the record in Bunnell, showed that the
administrative law judge ("ALJ") conducted the hearing in an
unacceptable manner that was sufficiently unfair as to constitute
a denial of plaintiff's constitutional right to a fair hearing.
The ALJ created an atmosphere where witnesses were inhibited and
intimidated by the judges conduct, and felt defensive; the ALJ
interfered

with the plaintiff's counsel's ability to make a

record or argue the evidence; and the judge gave the appearance
of having decided the case without even considering the medical
records.

Bunnell, 740 P.2d at 1333.

In the case at bar# the judge's statements and demeanor,
although an attempt to merely educate the pro se defendant, had
the effect of discouraging and persuading appellant from actually
deposing the appellee and effectively denied appellant the legal
right to depose the appellee, thereby, denying him access to
discoverable information that would have helped him adequately
prepare for trial.

See Transcripts of Hearing, January 27, 1993.

The trial judge's coraments went far beyond the realm of informing
or educating appellant.

They in fact deterred appellant from

deposing the appellee for fear of reprisal in the form of
attorneys fees and costs against him.
January 27, 1993, p.18, lines 13-14.
unreasonable.

See Transcript of Hearing,
Such conduct was

Thus, the trial court erred in its attempted

explanation of the rules and abused its discretion in that
regard.

The trial court's conduct denied appellant right of due

12

process in this case by not affording him sufficient time or
means to prepare an adequate defense.
The judge in this case created an atmosphere of intimidation
and inhibition.

Like the ALJ in Bunnell, the judge would

abruptly cut-off appellant's attempt to object or express his
disagreement with the trial court's purported explanation of
sanctions.

See Transcript of Hearing, January 27, 1993, p.13

lines 11-15, pp. 15-16.
Based on the foregoing arguments, appellant asks this Court
to find that the trial court's statements regarding sanctions for
deposing appellee were inappropriate and ultimately denied
appellant the fundamental right of due process of having adequate
time to prepare his defense.

Ill, REFUSAL TO ADMIT RELEVANT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE REGARDING
WORK PERFORMED UNDER THE AGREEMENT WAS ABUSE OF TRIAL COURT'S
DISCRETION.
The issue involved is whether the trial court's decision not
to admit appellant's documentary evidence of work performed by
both parties to the contract was an abuse of discretion.
Marshall v. Van Geruen. 790 P.2d 62 (Utah Ct.App. 1990).
Appellant contends that the trial court did in fact abuse
its discretion by not admitting relevant documentary evidence
that went to the very issue of substantial performance. However,
because of technical difficulties, there is no record of the
discussion and testimony between the parties and the court
regarding the exclusion of appellant's documentary evidence.
13

"An admissibility decision is the "sum of several rulings,
each of which may be reviewed under a separate standard.1"

State

v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 713 (Utah App. 1993)(quoting State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 (Utah 1993))-

This Appellate Court

in Horton, applied two standards of review in determining whether
the trial court properly excluded a witness1 affidavit: a
correction of error standard to the legal content of the trial
court's ruling not to admit the affidavit,

Id.; see Thurman at

1268-72; and an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the
trial court's ruling, pursuant to Rule 804(b)(5) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.

Horton, at 713.

In reviewing the legal content, the Court will examine (1)
whether the trial court selected the correct rule of evidence,
(2) whether the trial court correctly interpreted that rule, and
(3) whether the trial court correctly applied the rule.

Id.

Applying an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the trial
court's ruling, pursuant to Rule 804(b) (5)2, the Court will
examine whether the probative value of the evidence in question

lule 804(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
^ statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent
:ircumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness [will not
be excluded] if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission
of the statement into evidence.

14

outweighs the probative value of other evidence on point.

Id.

For rulings requiring a balancing of factors an abuse of
discretion or reasonability is the appropriate standard of
review.

Id.; see Thurman at 1270 n. 11; see also State v.

Knowles, 709 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1985).
During appellant's direct examination of Ms. Susan St. James
("St. James"), appellant offered into evidence documents that
were prepared by St. James which evidenced invoicing, billing
dates, check numbers, dates of payments, room-by-room breakdowns
of who actually located the needed furnishings, and who actually
arranged for the purchase of the furnishings involved in this
case.

Unfortunately, due to technical difficulties with the

recording equipment, St. James' testimony, appellant's motion to
enter such documentary evidence into the case and his objections,
appellee's attorney's objections to admissibility, and the courts
denial of admission were not recorded and did not become part of
the transcript.

See Exhibit J (Index and page 30).

Such

testimony and documentation were crucial in appellant's attempt
to show the court that there was in fact no substantial
performance on the part of the appellee.

See Exhibit G.

A

review of the Summary Report indicates that the appellee
performed only twenty-three percent (23%) of all the items
(includes both old furnishings and purchase of new items)
required by the agreement and only twenty-nine percent (29%) of
the new items (includes only new items purchased) required by the
agreement.

See Exhibit G, page 4.

15

Based upon the Summary

Report of performance regarding the agreement by both parties, it
is apparent that appellant performed a good portion of the work
that was required by the agreement.

Consequently, it is

appellant's contention that appellee performed only seventy-five
percent (75%) of her obligation under the agreement.

The Summary

Report goes into detail regarding which party performed what
functions under the agreement.

This Summary Report was, in fact,

of probative value to the very issue at hand, that is,
substantial performance.

Consequently, appellant asks this court

to find that the trial court's decision to not admit such
relevant documentary evidence was improper and an abuse of
discretion.

IV, and V, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OP FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The issues are whether the trial court's theory and grounds
for determining that appellant unjustifiably terminated the
contract between the parties was proper and whether the trial
court's findings were accurate.
The appropriate standards of review are that (1) the trial
court's interpretation of a contract is not entitled to any
particular weight on appeal, where the court interprets contract
as matter of law without regard for extrinsic evidence.

Baker v.

Western Sur. Co.. 757 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct.App. 1988); and (2) the
trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal
unless they "are against the clear weight of the evidence", or if
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite or firm
16

conviction that a mistake has been made.

State v. Walker, 743

P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
Appellant contests the trial court's findings that the
appellee substantially performed her obligations under the
contract and contends that the trial courts findings of fact lack
sufficient specificity and adequate evidentiary support.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides: that "[i]n
all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specifically and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon. . . . "
R.Civ.P. 52(a)(as amended Jan. 1, 1987).

Utah

The Utah Supreme and

Appellate Courts "consistently stress" the importance of adequate
"findings of fact."
App. 1991).

State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah

The failure to enter adequate findings of fact on

material issues may be reversible error.

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha

Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); see also Acton v. J.B.
Deliran, Corp., 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987).

To succeed in

challenging the findings, appellant must prove they are clearly
erroneous, i.e., against the clear weight of the evidence. Reid
v. Mutual, 776 P.2d at 899-901; Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850
P.2d 487, 489 (Utah App. 1993); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,
477 (Utah App. 1991).

"Therefore, if we are to determine whether

the evidence adduced at trial supports the trial courtfs
findings, the findings must embody sufficient detail and include
enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the evidence upon which
they are grounded."

Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d at 477.
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Meaningful review of a decision's evidentiary basis is virtually
impossible absent adequate findings of fact.

Id.; see State v.

Lovegren. 798 P.2d 767, 771 (Utah App. 1990).
In order to mount a successful challenge to the
correctness of a trial court's findings of fact the evidence
supporting the findings must be marshalled in order to
demonstrate "that the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the
findings."
(Utah 1989).

Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470
The following is the evidence admitted at trial:

the appellee was to provide interior decorating services to
appellant and St. James; appellee agreed to provide those
services over a twelve month period, beginning July 1, 1991 and
ending June 30, 1992; appellee agreed to payment of $2,000 per
quarter for a total of $8,000; appellee agreed to assist in all
decisions and in the purchase of furniture and accessories for
the home; appellee was out of town frequently as a flight
attendant; appellee assisted in the purchase of approximately
$30,000 worth of furnishings for the home; appellee was paid
$6,000 for services rendered; appellant was frustrated by
appellees performance and unavailability.
Appellant challenges the court's findings in that it
refused to hear or admit testimonial and documentary evidence
through his witness, St. James.

This evidence would have shown

the amount of services that was provided over the eight month
period for which the appellee was paid $6,000.
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It would have

shown that appellant and St. James had to do the majority of the
work for which appellee was paid.

The trial court, by its

decisions and statements made, appears to have concluded early on
that appellee was being paid for having obtained $30,000 worth of
furnishings and nothing more.

Each time appellant attempted to

explain his reasoning for wanting to present his evidence, to
prove the insufficiency of the appellee*s services, the trial
judge would cut him off stating that the evidence was irrelevant
to the type of contract that he believed it to be. Due to the
conclusory nature of the trial court's findings of fact, the
marshalling of facts in this case will largely be ineffectual.
See

woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d at 477.

In Woodward, the

Appellate Court stated:
There is, in effect, no need for an appellant to
marshal the evidence when the findings are so
inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged
as factual determinations. . . . [W]here the findings
are not of that caliber, appellant need not go through
a futile marshaling exercise. Rather, appellant can
simply argue the legal insufficiency of the court's
findings as framed.
Id.

Although, the trial court's findings of fact in Woodward.

constituted three full pages of text, they nonetheless provided
an inadequate account of the actual facts supporting the court's
ultimate decision.

Id.

In this case at bar, it appears that the trial court
interpreted the agreement between the parties as a matter of law
without regard to the relevant extrinsic evidence that appellant
tried to enter into evidence.

"If the trial court interprets a

contract as a matter of law without regard for extrinsic
19

evidence, we afford its interpretation no particular weight."
Baker v. Western Sur. Co., 757 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah App. 1988);
see Seashores Inc. v. Hancey. 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Utah Ct.App.
1987).

In our case, although it was clear that the trial court

did look at the appellee's extrinsic evidence, the trial court
did not consider the appellant!s extrinsic evidence that went to
the very heart of substantial performance, (i.e., billing
statements, check #'s, work performed).
Although the agreement between appellant and appellee
was a verbal agreement, it was memorialized by appellant, to
which appellee acquiesced.
legally binding.

As such it has been held to be

The trial judge stated that it was his duty to

hear testimony as to what agreement the parties understood they
were entering into and to interpret the terms of that agreement.
"The primary rule in interpreting a contract is to determine what
the parties intended by looking at the entire contract and all
its parts in relation to each other, giving an objective and
reasonable construction to the contract as a whole."

Appellant

contends that the trial court did not read the memorialized
agreement in its entirety.

It would seem that had the judge read

the agreement more carefully he would have allowed the admission
of evidence that would have contradicted the trial court's
conclusion that the appellee substantially performed.
Based on these arguments, appellant asks this Court to
find that trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law
are not supported by the evidence and do not accurately reflect
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the trial court!s findings.
IX.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, it is apparent that the
appellant did not, in fact, receive a fair trial, thereby denying
him a fundamental principle of due process.

The trial court

erred when it refused to grant appellant a reasonable amount of
time to prepare an adequate defense, made improper statements
that inhibited the appellants right to discovery, failed to
admit relevant extrinsic evidence that went to the very issue of
substantial performance and made findings that were not supported
by the evidence.

The trial court's conduct regarding these

matters did not provide appellant with his fundamental due
process right of a fair trial on the merits.
Consequently, the judgment of the trial court should be
reversed and/or remanded to the trial court to be tried to an
impartial jury in the interest of justice.
DATED this *-/£" day of January, 1994.
Kerjneth Allen
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On this 5 ^ day of January, 1994, I hereby certify that I
mailed by first-class, postage-prepaid,
two (2) true and correct
copies of the attached APPELLANT!S BRIEF to the following:
Brent A. Gold
333 Main Street, Second Floor
P.O. Box 1994
Park City, Utah 84060
Kenneth Allen
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Don Armstrong
P.O. Box 1059

Park City, Ut. 84060
801-649-6477 Fax: 801-649-6470
August 14, 1991
Yvonne M. Gillham
Concepts West Interiors
P.O. Box 2813
Park City, Utah
Ms. Gillham:
This letter Is to confirm my understanding regarding our agreement for
your providing interior decorating services to Susan and I regarding our
new home at 218 Golden Eagle Dr. Park City. Utah.
The basic term of the agreement is one year beginning July 1, 1991 and
ending June 30, 1992. We will pay you a total of $8,000.00 payable
$2,000.00 each quarter at the end of each quarter with the first payment
being due on September 30, 1991. You have agreed to assist in all of our
decisions and in the purchase of furniture and accessories for the home at
vour cost.
If you have any additions or questions please contact me at your
convenience.
Susan and I already appreciate your assistance and look forward to
pleasant and fun experience sharing our .new home with you.

Respectfully,

Donald E. Armstrong

["EXHIBIT

3

B

Donald E. Armstrong
P.O. Box 1059
Park City, Utah, 84060
Telephone:
801-649-6477

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SUMMIT COUNTY, PARK CITY DEPARTMENT

YVONNE GILLHAM, d.b.a.
CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD E. ARMSTRONG,
Defendant.

)
]

NOTICE OF APPEAL

;
)
]

Civil No.

])

923000086 CV

Judge: Roger A. Livingston

]

TO PLAINTIFF, YVONNE GILLHAM, dba CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS, AND HER
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, BRENT A. GOLD.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Defendant, Donald E. Armstrong, is
filing an appeal in the above case.

Dated this

12

day of April, 1993

Donald E. Armstrong,
Defendant

3RD CIRCUIT COURT - PARK'
m/12/93

TIME: 15:88 CLERK':

CASE: 323000086CV
PLAINTIFF: GILLHAM: YVONNE
DEFENDANT. ARMSTRONG'.. HONALI' E
PAV'OR: HONALI/ E. ARMSTRONG
Ami. Received:
Civil Fees NO: S39
Check •
Receipt No: S'38£4000S
JUDGE: LIVINGSTON; ROGER A.
SAVE THIS RECEIPT **** SAVE THIS

PROOF OF SERVICE BY FAX
Short Title of Case:
GILLHAM VS ARMSTRONG
MUNICIPAL COURT CIVIL NO: 923000086 CV
I, am employed in the Summit County, State of Utah, I am over the
age of 18 years and not a party to the within action. My business
address is:
218 Golden Eagle Drive
P.O. Box 1059
Park City, Utah 84060
On the date referred to below, I served the following document(s):
Notice Of Appeal

by placing a true copy thereof, in the fax machine, and
addressed as follows:
Brent Gold
Fax #649-8412
P.O. Box 1994
Park City, Utah 84060
I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
Utah that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on April 13, 1993

[UakLM^jA^Mjyi

c

RECEIVED
BRENT A. GOLD, 1213
Attorney for Plaintiff
333 Main Street, Second Floor
P.O. Box 1994
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (801) 649-8406

MAR 1 7 1993
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
PARK CITY DEPARTMENT

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SUMMIT COUNTY, PARK CITY DEPARTMENT
YVONNE GILLHAM, dba
CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 923000086
DONALD E. ARMSTRONG,
Judge Roger A. Livingston
Defendant.

Trial

in

the

above-entitled

matter

came

on

before

the

Honorable Roger A. Livingston, Circuit Court Judge, on Wednesday,
the 10th day of February, 1993, in Park City, Summit County, State
of

Utah.

The plaintiff, Yvonne

Gillham,

dba Concepts

West

Interiors, was present and represented by her counsel, Brent A.
Gold.

The

defendant, Donald

E. Armstrong, was present

and

represented himself.
The Court, having heard the sworn testimony of plaintiff and
defendant and witnesses called by each party, and having reviewed
and examined the evidence and exhibits submitted by the respective
parties and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, now herewith makes and enters judgment for and
in behalf of the plaintiff.

IT IS HEREWITH ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS

Yvonne Gillham, dba Concepts West Interiors, plaintiff in the
above-entitled matter, is herewith granted judgment as against the
defendant Donald E. Armstrong as follows:
!•

Judgment in the amount of $2,000.00 for design fees owed

to the plaintiff is herewith granted to the plaintiff as against
said defendant.
2.

Judgment for sales tax owed by defendant to plaintiff in

the amount of $1,925.00 is not granted to plaintiff as against said
defendant, for the reason that said amount was voluntarily paid at
the conclusion of the trial.

No interest or penalties as may be

assessed- by the Utah State Tax Commission are awarded to the
plaintiff on said sales tax amount.

Payment by the defendant of

said $1,925.00 to the plaintiff at the conclusion of trial between
the parties sljLall constitute satisfaction ofand be in lieu of said
judgment amount. No interest is awarded to plaintiff in connection
with said amount.
3.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded Judgment as against defendant

in the amount of $76.83 for costs expended by plaintiff.
4.

Plaintiff

is

further

awarded

Judgment

against

the

defendant for accrued interest from and after July 7, 1992 on all
of the amounts set forth in paragraphs 1 and 3 above, as follows:
(a)

Pre-judgment interest on all of the

above-said

amounts at the rate of 10% per annum until Judgment is entered or
2

until paid; and
(b)

Post-judgment interest at the rate of 12% per annum

from and after entry of Judgment until paid in full.
5.

The defendant is to take nothing by reason of his

counterclaims, and the same are hereby dismissed upon the merits.
DATED this//cxA^ day of March, 1993.
BY THE COURT \ ^ ^ ^

• ST/ir,->,
f-r-Jy" *,'>- \ ^
z?^' [^~ •''
*;

(

i

— y ;

Roger A. Livingston
Circuit Court Judge

— «r

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this
day of March, 1993, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment was mailed by U.S. mail,
postage pre-paid, to the following:
Donald E. Armstrong
P. 0. Box 1059
Park City, Utah
84060
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* ^ «»- V L, 3 *J £* 2 *
BRENT A. GOLD, 1213
Attorney for Plaintiff
333 Main Street, Second Floor
P.O. Box 1994
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (801) 649-8406

MAR ] g 1993
THIRD CIRCUIT C O N P T
?AnK C{ i"Y D!l"°As70cVn
l
"
"-"'

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SUMMIT COUNTY, PARK CITY DEPARTMENT
YVONNE GILLHAM, dba
CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS,

)
|

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

Civil No. 923000086

i

Judge Roger A. Livingston

Plaintiff,

vs.
DONALD E. ARMSTRONG,
Defendant.

Trial

in

the

above-entitled

matter

came

on

before

the

Honorable Roger A. Livingston, Circuit Court Judge, on Wednesday,
the 10th dayfof February, 1993, in Park City, Summit County, State
of

Utah.

The

plaintiff, Yvonne Gillham,

dba

Concepts

West

Interiors, was present and was represented by her counsel, Brent A.
Gold.

The

defendant, Donald E. Armstrong, was

present

and

represented himself.
The Court, having heard the sworn testimony of plaintiff and
defendant and witnesses

as called by each party, and

having

reviewed and examined the evidence and exhibits submitted by the
respective parties, and being fully advised in the premises, does
now make and adopt the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The plaintiff is a resident of and is licensed to do

business as an interior designer in Park City, Summit County, State
of Utah.
2.

The defendant owns a home and property in Park City,

Summit County, State of Utah.
3.

That all services rendered by the plaintiff

and 'all

matters and agreements related to this matter were entered into and
occurred in Park City, Summit County, State of Utah.
4.

The amount in controversy and claimed by the defendant in

this matter is less than $20,000.00.
5.

On or about August 14, 1991, an agreement was entered

into between plaintiff and defendant whereby plaintiff was to
perform interior decorating services for defendant at his heme
located in Park City, Utah.
6.

The agreement between the parties was in writing and was

prepared solely and exclusively by the defendant.
7.

The agreement of August 14, 1991 between the parties was

preceded by approximately 10 months of periodic consultation and
negotiation between plaintiff and defendant.
Q.
defendant

By reason of those negotiations and consultations, the
was

fully

advised

of plaintiff's

job

as

a

flight

attendant and the time constraints upon plaintiff, and availability
of plaintiff by reason of said job as a flight attendant.

2

9.

The contract between plaintiff and aefendant provided

that plaintiff would

be paid a design fee in the amount of

$8,000.00 for her services, and that said design fee would be paid
by way of $2,000.00 quarterly payments with the first payment being
due on September 30, 1991.
10.
the

Further, the contract between the parties provided that

defendant

would

pay

for

the

purchase

of

furniture

and

accessories obtained by the plaintiff at cost.
11.

At the commencement of, or prior to the agreement between

the parties, the plaintiff had informed the defendant that her work
could be completed in approximately eight months.
12.

The

work

to

be

performed

by

the

plaintiff

was

substantially completed by the end of March, 1992.
13.
that

Notwithstanding interpersonal disputes and disagreements

arose

between

plaintiff

and

defendant,

the

defendant

acknowledged that the work performed by the plaintiff and the
furniture

and

furnishings

obtained by

the plaintiff

were

of

acceptable types, kinds and quality.
14.

On or before June 30, 1992, the defendant had paid

plaintiff the amount of $30,801.32 for the furniture and furnishing
packages that had been provided by the plaintiff.
15.

The defendant failed and refused to pay to the plaintiff

Utah state sales tax upon the furniture package purchase price,
which sales tax was in the amount of $1,925.00.
16.

Sales tax in the amount of $1,925.00 was a cost of the

plaintiff pursuant to the agreement between the parties. Plaintiff
3

demanded payment of sales tax by the defendant, and defendant
refused payment of said sales tax amount. At the conclusion of the
trial, the defendant fully and completely acknowledged that the
sales tax amount was in fact owed to the plaintiff, and in presence
of the Court, the defendant made payment to the plaintiff of the
full $1,925.00 sales tax amount.
17.

On or before

June 30, 1992, defendant

had paid

to

plaintiff $6,000.00 of the $8,000.00 design fee that was ovjed
plaintiff pursuant to the contract between the parties.
18.

Despite requests and demands from the plaintiff that the

balance of the design fee in the amount of $2,000.00 be paid by the
defendant, the defendant failed and refused to pay said remaining
balance.
19.
March,

The defendant claims that during the latter portion of

1992, he attempted

to terminate the agreement

between

plaintiff and defendant by sending a notice of such termination to
the plaintiff. Defendant admits that he did not mail the notice of
termination and alleges that his secretary mailed the letter to
plaintiff.

Defendant's secretary did not attend trial and did not

testify.
20.

Plaintiff alleges that she never received the letter of

termination in March or April of 1992, and did not see the letter
until a copy was supplied by the defendant in August of 1992.
21.

The work to be performed by the plaintiff in any event

was completed by late March or early April of 1992. Performance by
the plaintiff was timely and in accord with the contract between
4

the parties.
22.

The plaintiff continued to communicate with defendant and

defendant's wife during April and May of 1992, and was not]informed
by them of any termination.
23.

On

or

about

July

7,

1992, the

plaintiff

provided

defendant final billing for work performed by her, which billing
included request for payment of the remaining balance of $2,000.00
of the design fee and sales tax in the amount of $1,925.00 owed to
the State of Utah.
24.

Defendant failed and refused to pay said amounts.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and enters its Conclusions of Law.
1.

The

Court

in

this

matter

has

full

and

complete

jurisdiction, both over the parties and over plaintiff's cause of
action.
2.

Th.at a qood and valid written contract was entered into

between the parties on or about August 14, 1991.
3.

The letter dated August 14, 1991, which memorialized the

agreement between the parties was prepared solely and exclusively
by the defendant, and accordingly any ambiguities in the agreement
should be and are construed as against the drafter of the document.
4.

The agreement between the parties provided that the

plaintiff was to be paid a design fee of $8,000.00, . with said
amount to be paid by quarterly

installments, with

installment due on September 30, 1991.
5

the

first

5.

The agreement between the parties further provided that

the defendant is to pay all costs of furniture and accessories
obtained by the plaintiff for the defendant.
6-

As a matter of law, the sales tax amount of $1,925.00

assessed as against the purchase price for the furniture and
furnishings provided by the plaintiff is a cost to be paid by the
defendant under the agreement between the parties.
7.

In breach and violation of the agreement between the

parties, the defendant

failed to pay the plaintiff

the final

$2,000.00 of the design fee owed to the plaintiff, and also failed
to pay the $1,925.00 sales tax amount to the plaintiff.
8.

Plaintiff's performance under the agreement between tie

parties was fully and satisfactorily performed pursuant to the
agreement between the parties.
9.

Whatever attempts that were made by the defendant to

terminate the contract in the latter portion of March, 1992, were
unilateral in nature, untimely, and occurred after the plaintiff
had already substantially performed under her agreement with the
defendant.

Defendant's attempt to terminate the contract was not

based upon facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant any such
termination.
10.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against defendant in

the following amounts:
a.

$2,000.00

for

balance

of

design

fee

owed

to

plaintiff.
b.

$1,925.00 owed as sales tax owed to the State of
6

Utah.
at

Payment by the defendant of said $1,925.00 to the plaintiff

conclusion

of

trial

shall

constitute

satisfaction

of

said

judgment amount.
c.

Plaintiff is to be awarded her costs as may be duly

verified in accord with Rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
d.

Pre-judgment interest in the amount of 10% per annum

upon the above-said amount, after July 7, 1992 until Judgment is
entered or until paid; and post-judgment interest in the amount of
12% per annum upon the above-said amounts from and after entry of
Judgment until paid.
11.

The

defendant

is

to

take

nothing

by

reason

of

his

counterclaims and the same are to be dismissed upon the merits.
12.

No

judgment

is to be awarded

the

plaintiff

for

any

interest or penalty that may be assessed by the Utah State Tax
Commission.
13.
defendant.

No

attorney
The

fees are awarded

Court

determines

to either plaintiff

that there was

no bad

or

faith

sufficient to justify awarding of such fees.
Judgment is to be awarded plaintiff consistent with the above
and foregoing.
DATED this

^
/ /

da^^af March, 199-3/*

f

otger" K. JL-ivingston,
iTcudbt-<fourt fcruc&je

MAILING CERTIFICATE
c>

I hereby certify that on this *• ^ day of March, 1993, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law was mailed by U.S. mail, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Donald E. Armstrong
P. 0. Box 1059
Park City, Utah
84060

L-rs. ...CU\( c-,..^
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Donald E. Armstrong
P.O. Box 1059
Park City, Utah, 84060
Telephone:
801-649-6477

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SUMMIT COUNTY, PARK CITY DEPARTMENT

YVONNE GILLHAM, d.b.a.
CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS,

)
)
)

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOF
REQUEST FOR CONTINUATION OF
TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD E. ARMSTRONG,
Defendant.

])

Civil No.

]
)
]

923000086 CV

Judge: Roger A. Livingston

TO PLAINTIFF, YVONNE GILLHAM, dba CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS, AND HER
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, BRENT A. GOLD.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on

Q

/njltr^/tfor

as soon thereafter

as may be heard in the Third Circuit Court of the State of Utah, Summit
County, Park City Department, Donald E. Armstrong, defendant, by his
signature below, hereby requests a hearing in the above case to continue
the trial and to complete discovery.
This motion is made pursuant to Utah Rules of Civii Procedure 7 and
40.

Rule 40 states that the Court can continue a trial at it's discretion.

Defendant represents to the Court the following items for the Court to
consider:
1.

That defendant has not had reasonable time to pursue

discovery and that additional time is. required to complete discovery.
2.

That defendant believes it will take approximately 90 days to

complete said discovery subject to the cooperation of the Plaintiff and of
Defendant's ability to discover the necessary documents.

It is

contemplated that Plaintiff can provide most documents but in the event
Plaintiff resists, Defendant may have to seek other sources for the
necessary documents.
3.

Defandant is now serving notice to Plaintiff of taking

Plaintiff's deposition, a Request for documents and a Request for
Admissions (Copies attached).
4.

Estimated time for trial is one to two days.

Defendant requests a continuance of this trial until after May 1, 1993.
This motion is based upon this notice of motion and motion.
Dated this 15th day of January, 1993

Donald E. Armstrong,
Defendant

F

Kenneth Allen (6162)
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
10 West Broadway, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone:(801) 322-2458

IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS
YVONNE GILLHAM, dba
CONCEPTS WEST INTERIORS,
AFFIDAVIT OF
SUSAN ST. JAMES

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
DONALD E. ARMSTRONG,

CIVIL NO. 930236-CA
Defendant/Appellant.
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake )

ss

SUSAN ST. JAMES ("Affiant")/ being first duly sworn upon her
oath, deposes and states as follows:

1.

Affiant was called as a witness for appellant at the

February 10, 1993, trial in the above referenced case.

2.

That a good portion of my testimony by way of direct

examination by appellant which began on page thirty (30) of the
trial transcript was omitted.

That the entire swearing in,

several questions and answers were not recorded.

3.

That appellant asked me on direct examination,
1

questions about the relationship with appellee and the problems
that arose.

4.

That during my direct examination by appellant, the

appellant attempted to introduce some documentation that I had
prepared which evidenced invoicing, billing dates, check numbers,
dates of payments, room by room breakdowns, who actually located
the needed furnishings, and who actually arranged for the
purchase of the furnishings regarding this case.

5.

That the testimony that I gave was material to the

issue of substantial performance in this case.

My testimony

would have supported appellants claim that appellee in fact did
not substantially perform her obligation in locating and
arranging for the purchase of furnishings pursuant to our
agreement.

6.

That appellee's attorney objected to the admissibility

of such documentation and that the trial court judge sustained
appellee1s objection and appellant was not allowed to admit such
documentation into evidence.

7.

That such portion of my testimony did in fact take

place at the trial on February 10, 1993, but was omitted from the
transcript due to the audio recording equipment not functioning
at that particular time.

2

8.

That attached to this affidavit is the actual

documentation that appellant attempted to admit into evidence at
the February 10, 1993, trial during my direct examination,
DATED this

I

day of November, 1993.
Susan St. James

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me by SUSAN
ST. JAMES on this r*^ day of November, 1993.

fi&.
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n
jliLu.
(
i&UvUX
Notar Public
y
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Amount Due Date Paid

uaie

Yvonne Bills
Check #
Amount Paid Comments

From Yvonne
#170

8/14/91

#112 (Invoice Really Confusing)
Wjlh Cover Letter
Verbal Request
Pkg. #1
No Purchase orders
Statement of Account pg.

I

10/4/91

$162.00
$2,000.00
$10,115.21

8/14/91
-3/20/91
10/8/91

4529
4552_
1002

$162.00
$2000.00
$11,209.50

Alter this we decided we needed Yvonne to~~ [ TIP~~A—f^L
.provide documentation lor all transactions. ~ $ W j t ^ < W n f (\&-prn

tlZ L T ^
***&
n

10/19/91
4558
$ 2 , 8 0 4 . 0 0 [we were concerned about this, we discussed it. d i d | ^ l l ^ nrV*^-tfv«;
.11/7/91
126 J L L 0 1 2 . 0 0
1 1/14/91
$3,428.80 Nothing Due - This was merely a
At this time we were moving into our i
^ 6 (\Ctt>^af\ M*
n
. . . Statement of account for that date.
house about 2 months ahead of schedule.
i ^ f i e ^ A t o ^ - t M . M d r t ^ ^ v l i S c h a d SWd
wrSecn
Yvonne was gone alot. I had to call various
SKppfA^
^companies to^see where the orders stood.
12/15/91
$2,000.00
12/17/91
147
$ 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 DesigrTPees
12/17/91
12/17/91
$2,542.28
146
$2,542.38
1/7/92
162
$1,900.00
1/17/92
1/17/92
167
$877.63
4CL<JC\^
i*jUiO$
Ufa

Ufih I fyoYtUA^ Z

#123
Cover Sheet
Verbal Request
Revised Pkg. #1
1
^jrniture Handwritten St\tc%
Revised: statement
2/4/92
$1,042.55
2i14/92
201
$ 1 , 0 4 2 . 5 5 I Requested PO's on this. It was really
— .
jf Acc't. Furniture Pkp. #1
confusing. X > 6 * J u j A S Old 0? JOk*) - k& CeOM^L dl4
l^T
jta'Tecnent o f A c c t ^ f g f o f t z 2 / 4 / 9 2 " $1,724.37
2/14/92
202
$1,724.37
Note Tflfere are 2 page_5sJhe.Jlcst,one. shows $1200 Deposiffchte:
he"Second shows $1724.37 due In handwriting, This was such a mess it took hours to go over
latching payments & how they were disbursed with the purchase orders.
pM-^PiovOn
2/25/92
fYVusv Vv<rc p ^ r o J n r - f t c r o no4L>tv\ i t o i w X ^ t U . - x : £<^
221 $1,138.60

£%xd-

s/o *nc>
152

3/30/92
4/7/92

rniture Pkg. $2

.

4/7/92

pfe^'3S
$2,000
0
$1,028.39

2/25/92
2/26/92
2/26/92
3/25/92

223
224
225
250

$357.43
$521.30
$267.22
$2,000.00

4/9/92
4/9/92

258
324

$125.00
$903.39

# ^yjrS * tt&W ite'K,/<^ ij^ws , A ^ ^<?w/H /j

Paid 5 days advance by MarlenaVWith ftt/w- S
Ieltef*t6~ehd services.7^

Furniture Pkg. now paid in full.

.

.
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Room

Existing Pieces

Items needed

Who Found

W h o Arranged
Purchase

DieJ We
A ssist

Our
Points

Yvonne

Points

Complete

Comments
Problems

L i v i n g Room
Bookshelves
Stereo Section
Fireplace Mantle
2 Couches
2 Choirs
2 Tables
1 Collee Table
2 Lamps
Fabric
1 Area Rug

We did
We did
We did
Yvonne
Both
Both

We did
We did
We did
Yvonne
Yvonne
Yvonne
Yvonne
Yvonne
Yvonne
Vvonne

We did
Both
Both
Both

Dining Room
Buffet
Dining Table
1 framed art piece
8 chairs
Side piece
6 barstools
Fabric lor stools
Area Rug

Yvonne

We did
We did
We did
Yvonne
We did
We did
Yvonne
Yvonne

We d«d

We did

We did
Yvonne
We did
We did

We did
Yvonne
Yvonne
We did

We did
We did
We did
We did
Both
Wed.d
Both

Reception
Desk
Side Chair/Otttoman
Desk Chair
New Fabric
Credenze

Don's Office
Backgammon Table

We did

We did
Page 1

Yes
Yes
Yes

\^
Yes
Y*s

0

2

0
0
2
2
2
1
2
2
2

2
2
0

See Note 21

Room

Desk
Credenza
Bookshelves
4 Chairs
Fabric

Who Found
We did
We did
We did
Both
Both

Who Arranged
Purchase
We did
We did
We did
Yvonne
Yvonne

Bookshelves
Cabinets
Computer Furniture
Entertainment Center
Refrigerator

We
We
We
We
We
We

did
did
did
did
did
did

We
We
We
We
We
We

We
We
We
We
We
We
We

did
did
did
did
did
did
did

We
We
We
We
We
We
We

Bed Mattress
Head Board & Toot Board
2 Nite Stands
Chest of Drav.ers
Rocking Chair
Bedding
Window Coverings

We
We
We
We

did
did
did
did

Wall Mirrors

Existing Pieces

Items needed

Did We
Assist

Yvonne
Points

Our
Points

Complete

0
0
0
2
2

2
2
2
t
1

did
did
did
did
did
did

0
0
0
0
0

2
2
2
2
2

0

2

did
did
did
did
did
did
did

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

0
1
1

2
1
1

We did
We did
We did

We did
Yvonne
Yvonne
Yvonne
Yvonne
We did
We did

1
1
0
0

1
1
2
2

Both
We did
Both

We did
We did
Yvonne

1
0
2

2
2
1

Computer R o o m
Chairs

First Guest Bedroom
Bed & Head Board
2 nite tables
Chest of Drawers
Bedding
Lamps
Window coverings

Second Guest Bedroom

Three Downstairs Bedrooms

Towels
Wall Coverings

Page 2

Comments
Problems

Room

E x i s t i n g Pieces

Items needed

W h o Found

W h o Arranged
Purchase

Did We
Assist

Yvonne
Points

Our
Points

Complete

Recreation R o o m
Entertainment Center

We did

2 Couches
Piano
Table
Collee Table
Lamp
Television
Stereo Systt-in

We
We
We
We
We
We
We

Framed Art

We did

We did

Hutch
Bench

Both
We did

Wall Covering
Towels
Bathroom Fixtures
Flooring
Cabinets

Both
We
We
We
We

We
We
We
We
We
We

did
did
did
did
did
did

0

2

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

We did
We did

1
0

2
2

did
did
did
did

Yvonne
We did
We did
We did
We did

2
0
0
0
0

1
2
2
2
2

Hail Tree

We did

We did

Mirror
Wall lights
Bathroom fixtures

We did
We did
We did

We did
We did
We did

0
0
0

2
2
2

did
did
did
did
did
did
did

We did
We did

Lower Landing

Foyer

Master

Bath

Second Level Landing

Office

Bath

Susan's Office
Page 3

Comments
Problems

Room

Existing Pieces
Rocking Chair
Lawyer's Book Case
Stereo

It ems needed
We
We
We
We

Desk
Desk Chair
Fabric
Floors

Who F o u n d
did
did
did
did

Yvonne
Both

Wh
ho
o Arranged
W
Pu
ase
We did
We did
We did
We did

Did We
Assist

Yvonn
Point;
0
0
0
0
2
2

Yvonne
Yvonne

throughout
Carpeting

We did
We did

Wood Flooring

We did
We did

Yvonne Participation
Total I t e m s
P e r c e n t a g e of T o t a l I t e m s
Totals
Percentages
Total of Items We a l r e a d y had

( T o t a l o f all I t e m s
19

Total of New Items
Percentages

Percentage

38
58

New I t e m s

Page 4

Our
Points

26
77
34%

40
23%

Items

Complete
2
2
2
2
0
1

Comments
Problems

H
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Yvonne Gillham v. Donald E. Armstrong
PAGE

COMMENTS

25

talking over each other - recorded on only one
track, couldn't separate them out

33

three of four words missing- not talking into mike only one track

49

away from mike

72

couldn't understand the word

76

couldn't understand him

79

couldn't understand him

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS OF FACT
5

away from mike

12

"Unidentified Speaker" - I couldn't tell if it was
Mr. Gold or Mr. Armstrong

14

speaking too fast

P R O C E E D I N G S
2

THE COURT:

Mr. Gold and Mr. Armstrong, why don't you

3 both come forward for a minute.
4

Okay.

I now—I have received some corrected Findings

5 of Fact and Conclusions of Law and I want to just go through
6 those very quickly and make certain that they comport with the
7 Court's ruling.

And then either or both of you can do what

8 you choose to do with that.
9

Let's turn to the Findings of Fact first.

Do you

10 have a copy of those, Mr. Armstrong?
11

MR. ARMSTRONG:

12 one thing.
13 ing here.

Yes.

Your Honor, could I just say

I wrote Mr. Gold a letter based on our last hearAnd there are very little changes between this

14 second version and the first version.
15

THE COURT:

16

MR. GOLD:

Okay.
If it helps, Your Honor, I could point out

17 specifically the paragraphs of the findings that have—
18

THE COURT:

Well, I made some pencil changes on my

19 old—on the old copy.

Okay, on Finding of Fact No. 7, I

20 wanted extensive change to periodic.

I believe the testimony

21 would be fairly characterized there were period consultations.
22 Whether it was extensive or minimal, I—there was some
23 variance in the testimony but there was some period consulta24 tion.

That change was made and then on paragraph 8 the words

25 "extensive" were delineated.

1

Then with respect to the $1,925, that—paragraphs 15

2 and 16 have been altered by putting as a finding of fact, "At
3 the conclusion of the trial the defendant fully and completely
4 acknowledged that the sales was in fact owed to the plaintiff
5 in the presence of the Court.

The defendant made payment to

6 the plaintiff of the full $1,925 sales amount."

So, that is

7 reflected, rather than having that reflected in the judgment.
8

Okay.

Then I also reguested that in—on paragraph 22

9 that we insert the word "orally"—"that plaintiff continued to
10 communicate with defendant and defendant's wife during April
11 1992 and was not orally informed by them o f " —
12

MR. GOLD:

That was not inserted, Your Honor.

I have

13 no objection.
14

THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Armstrong, by interlineation

15 I'm just going to insert the word "orally."

I believe that

16 when you and I talked briefly about those findings I told you
17 that I did not make a specific finding as to whether or not
18 that letter was mailed, delivered or whatever.
19 was that it was not orally informed.

The finding

Indeed, I indicate in

20 the findings it didn't—my oral ruling that it didn't matter
21 whether that letter was delivered or not, it would make no
22 difference because of the timeliness of it.

The work had

23 essentially been completed.
24

Then on the Conclusions of Law, I had suggested to

25 both of you—and I did this at different settings but said the

1 same thing to both of you—that paragraph 9 needed to be
2 changed.
3

MR. GOLD:

4

THE COURT:

That was changed, Your Honor.
Right.

And we inserted the words "what-

5 ever attempts were made by defendant."

And, again,

6 understand, both of you, that I didn't make a finding whether
7 the letter was sent or not.

There was competing testimony

8 whether it was sent or received.

But whatever attempts were

9 made by the defendant to terminate the contract in the latter
10 portion of 1992 were unilateral in nature, untimely, and
11 occurred after the plaintiff had already substantially
12 performed under her agreement with the defendant.
13

MR. ARMSTRONG:

I think the last sentence there,

14 there's been no discussion ever of anything like that that I
15 remember.
16

THE COURT:

The last sentence?

17

MR. ARMSTRONG:

18

THE COURT:

In the 9 that I have.

"Defendant's attempt to terminate the

19 contract was not based upon facts and circumstances sufficient
20 to warrant any such termination."

Well, that's really—it's a

21 little bit redundant but that's not my finding.

Is that—if

22 it were opposite of that, I would rule in your favor.

But

23 they were—that did not terminate—that did not contemplate a
24 termination of the contract.
25 performed.

Indeed, because it was already

So, I have no problem with that.

1

I did want No. 10(b) delineated—why are we leaving

2 the judgment and then satisfying it?
3

MR. GOLD:

Your Honor, let me explain that.

It was

4 changed from the way that it was set forth (inaudible).

And

5 it was changed—"Payment of the $1,925 to the plaintiff at the
6 conclusion of trial constitutes satisfaction of said judgment
7 amount."

And the reason that I think it's imperative that it

8 be left in there i s —
9

THE COURT:

That's to avoid your hassle with the

10 State Tax Commission as far a s —
11

MR. GOLD:

The State Tax Commission and not only

12 that, Mr. Armstrong has indicated that he may well appeal.
13 And I think it's very important to note that except for the
14 payment of the money at the time—
15

THE COURT:

Well, I think the important thing is the

16 judgment only be for the correct amount and not for the
17 $1,925.
18

MR. GOLD:

That's right.

The judgment reflects

19 exactly the same thing, that the $1,925 is fully and
20 completely satisfied.

No judgment, including interest,

21 penalties of any kind, are related to the $1,925.
22

THE COURT:

Now, Mr. Armstrong, what specific objec-

23 tion do you have, then, with the—it appears that Mr. Gold has
24 in fact corrected and modified his previously submitted
25 documents to comport with the concerns that I had.

What other

1 objections do you have to either the Findings of Fact,
2 Conclusions or the separate judgment form?
3

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Well, first of all, the last hear-

4 ing—both the trial and at the hearing where Mr. Gold wasn't
5 present, you specifically wanted the $1,925 not included here
6 and now we've changed that again.
7

I don't understand that.

I don't, you know, want a judgment (a) for any "more

8 than it should be and all this discussion of it, and (b) that
9 that is specifically against what you had said twice.
10 Mr. Gold has changed things around and then he's added things
11 back in, like the second sentence.

And if I'm going to

12 appeal, then—
13

THE COURT:

14

MR. ARMSTRONG:

15 read.

What second sentence of what?
I'm talking about that one you just

Defendant admits—let's see, wait.

16

THE COURT:

Where are you?

17

MR. ARMSTRONG:

I'm trying to find it.

In the—at

18 the hearing where, again, Mr. Gold wasn't here, the word you
19 wanted in one of those paragraphs was "some consultation," not
20 "periodic" or "extensive."
21

THE COURT:

There was two meetings.

Well, I direct Mr. Gold to do periodic.

22 In fact, that's what I wrote on the—on my corrected copy.
23

Okay, do you have any objection, then?

24

MR. ARMSTRONG:

25

THE COURT:

Yes, I'm looking.

Okay.

1

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Paragraph 19—no, I'm sorry, that's

2 that same—paragraph 9 of the—we've already talked about—
3 conclusion of law.

"Defendant's attempt to terminate the

4 contract was not based upon"—I don't understand why it needs
5 to be in there, that was never discussed.

I guess I feel like

6 there was testimony at the trial that—it was pretty even.
7 And most of Mr. Gold's position is in here and my position
8 isn't and he's taken some things out to comply with you and
9 then he adds sentences back in to cover it again.

He's got

10 the t a x —
11

THE COURT:

Mr. Armstrong, I know you don't like the

12 ruling.

That's what the Court of Appeals is for.

13 me, if that's what you want to do.
14

MR. ARMSTRONG:

15

THE COURT:

Go appeal

But I ruled against you.

I understand, but this—

And that sentence, "Defendant's attempt

16 to terminate the contract was not based upon fact and circum17 stances sufficient to warrant any such termination," is
18 exactly what I ruled.

If it were not that, then you would

19 have won.
20

MR. ARMSTRONG:

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

What's the legal objection to that?

I

22 say you don't like—you don't like the answer but that's
23 different—
24

MR. ARMSTRONG:

25 what you said in trial.

No, no, what I'm saying is that isn't
That isn't what was the finding—you

1 made that first sentence and you did specifically say you
2 didn't want sales tax in there and now Mr. Gold wants it in
3 there and—
THE COURT:

4

Let's deal with one issue at a time,

5 Mr. Armstrong, and this is—you know, I have, frankly, dealt
6 with this to the point of adnauseum and I think—I want to end
7 it.

Now, number one, that second sentence, frankly, I'm not

8 sure that it even adds anything to the first sentence.
9 is not in an accurate statement.

But it

A conclusion of law is

10 whatever attempt that you made to terminate the contract, it
11 was not based upon the facts and circumstances sufficient to
12 warrant such termination, i.e., it was not—even if made, as
13 you argued, that it was not done in a timely way.

It would a

14 prospective, not a retroactive termination.
15

And I have, you know, stated that repeatedly.

It

16 does not diminish—Mr. Gold, I'm not sure it adds anything,
17 either.

I mean, so what if it's there, I guess, is what I'm

18 saying.

That is my ruling and it was not in his first draft

19 and it's in that one.
20

MR. GOLD:

Do you care if it's in it, Mr. Gold?

I think I want it in there because on an

21 appeal, that is the ultimate conclusion.
22 part is specific.
23

THE COURT:

I think the first

The last sentence is a statement—
It's the "thus," I suppose.

That is

24 what—I know you disagree with the ruling, but that's what the
25 ruling was.

I'm going to have that sentence remain in

1 paragraph 9.
Now, with respect to the $1,200, however—or $1,925,

2

3 Mr. Gold, I don't think there's any question that
4 Mr. Armstrong paid that to you in court with the firm under5 standing that that was not to be a judgment.
6 lieu of a judgment being entered.
MR. GOLD:

7

That was paid in

That was paid that day.

Well, Your Honor, here is what I would

8 have to say in connection with that.

If there is an appeal in

9 this matter, I think it's very important to note that had he
10 not paid that amount, there would have been a judgment.
THE COURT:

11
12 of Fact.
13

Sure, and that's clear from the Findings

There's no question about that.
MR. GOLD:

All right.

So, if he goes in and he makes

14 some—without reference that that was the Court's conclusion—
15 I mean, he should pay the $1,925 if there was a full
16 acknowledgment.
17
18 there.

THE COURT:

Yeah.

There's no question that's in

But, still, in the judgment form in paragraph 2,

19 you're still taking judgment for $1,925 and satisfying it.
20 Again, I don't think it makes a bit of difference one way or
21 another except that it's different than what the arrangement
22 was.

I suppose Mr. Armstrong, I mean, could have chosen to

23 pay the $1,925 today or not at all, or whatever, if a judgment
24 had been entered.
25

The advantage really is to you, Mr. Armstrong, is

9

1 that the $1,925 just takes care of it.

There's not legal

2 interest on that, it doesn't—and regardless of how we do
3 that, it's taken care of.

Again, as with the prior concern

4 you had in that paragraph 9, I don't know that it makes any
5 difference one way or another.

But I will amend that para-

6 graph 2 simply to accurately cite what we did.

And that is

7 the judgment for the sales tax by the defendant is not granted
8 for the reason that the amount was paid in court.

And the

9 Findings of Fact already acknowledge that it was due and owing
10 and it was paid.
11

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Your Honor, just as Mr. Gold wants

12 that sentence in there, I don't want it in there.
13

THE COURT:

Did you not hear me?

I'm going to take

14 it out, okay?
15

MR. ARMSTRONG:

16

THE COURT:

17 that one.
18

In paragraph 9?

In paragraph 2.

I've already ruled on

I'm going to keep that—

MR. ARMSTRONG:

I don't see why he can have things

19 that never happened in court—
20

THE COURT:

21 Mr. Armstrong.

Because—I'll tell you exactly why,

And that is because these are my findings and

22 my conclusions, I found them and I ruled that way.
23 don't like it, appeal it.
24 you, okay?

If you

I don't know how else to say it to

If you don't like it, appeal that.

25 accurately reflects my best judgment.

That statement

I want you to know I

T

n

1 listened very carefully, I did the very best job I could in
2 this case, okay?

I ruled against you.

When we have a law-

3 suit, somebody wins, somebody loses, okay?

I found the

4 evidence to be more persuasive that the contract, in fact,
5 (a) was completed, (b) that you owed the money, (c) that your
6 attempting to terminate it was a day late and a dollar short.
7 She already earned the money.
8

Whether or not this letter was mailed, it didn't

9 matter one iota in the decision to me because she had already
10 earned the money.
11 the evidence.

I believe that by a simple preponderance of

It's not a criminal case, it's a civil case.

12 The preponderance of the evidence was indeed that she was
13 entitled to the money.

Your efforts to terminate had no force

14 or effect.
15

Again, paragraph No. 9 is consistent with that.

To a

16 degree it's arguably multiplying words that may be unnecessary
17 but it certainly is consistent with the ruling of the Court.
18 And there is nothing in paragraph 9 that is inconsistent with
19 my ruling.

It accurately reflects what it is.

Had I written

20 it first instead of having attorneys draft it, I'd probably
21 have been a little less wordy.

I probably would have mada the

22 two sentences into one sentence.

But I have no problem with

23 signing that, it accurately reflects the ruling of the Court.
24

Okay.

25

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Now, does that answer that one for you?
Never mind.

11

THE COURT:

What does never mind me?

2

MR. ARMSTRONG:

3

THE COURT:

I don't agree with you.

Well, I just—you're the litigant and I'm

4 the Judge.
5

MR. ARMSTRONG:

6

THE COURT:

That doesn't matter.

You're entitled to understand—you're

7 entitled to present your position but that doesn't mean that
8 you get it granted every time.
9
10

MR. ARMSTRONG:
THE COURT:

Well, that's fine.

Okay.

All right, now paragraph No. 2 on

11 the judgment form, I'm going to have that paragraph No. 2
12 altered, Mr. Gold, again to reflect consistently both with the
13 prior direction by the Court and the firm understanding when
14 that payment was made in court.

And that is that judgment

15 would not be—would, in fact, not enter for that amount.
16

Again, I'm not sure it makes any practical difference

17 to enter and—simultaneously enter and satisfy a judgment.

It

18 probably has the same—it doesn't make any practical
19 difference.

But, again, that was the understanding

20 Mr. Armstrong had and the Court had and I think that it's more
21 appropriate that the judgment reflect that.
22

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

Well, I don't agree with you

23 but you're the Judge.
24

THE COURT:

Okay.

So, what I'm going to do i s — I

25 don't have any problem making one word change by

12

1 interlineation.

Is this on your word processor?

2

MR. GOLD:

Yes.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

How I'm going to change this,

4 paragraph No. 2, is, "Judgment for sales tax owed to plaintiff
5 by defendant in the amount of $1,925 is"—instead of "here6 with," I'm going to strike that and put "not granted to
7 plaintiff as against defendant."

And then eliminate the'

8 period and put "for the reason that said amount was volun9 tarily paid at the conclusion of the trial."
10

The next sentence will remain, "No interest or

11 penalties as may be assessed by the Utah State Tax Commission
12 are awarded to the plaintiff on said amount."

So, that

13 protects you, Mr. Armstrong, that you're not going to—at
14 least this Court is not going to order that you pick up any
15 additional amount for the late payment.
16

The next sentence, "Payment by plaintiff of the

17 $1,925"—I'm being a little redundant.

"Said payment"—we'll

18 insert the word, "Said payment by the defendant of"—let's
19 eliminate that second "said"—"$1,925 to the plaintiff at the
20- trial between the parties shall constitute satisfaction of
21 said"—"shall constitute satisfaction and be in lieu of said
22 judgment amount.

No interest is awarded to plaintiff in

23 connection with said amount."
24

Okay.

Do you—Mr. Gold, do you have that that you

25 could run it off on your word processor today?

13

1

MR. GOLD:

We could do that in very short order.

2 long will you be here today?

How

I'd like to get this thing

3 signed and entered today.
4

THE COURT:

5

MR. GOLD:

6

THE COURT:

I'll be here, oh, I'm sure an hour.
We can do that.
Can we do that?

Okay, and Mr. Armstrong

7 I will also direct the Clerk of the Court to provide a copy of
8 the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment to
9 you with those amendments.

And specifically, then, as I

10 understand it, there were two objections that you had to the
11 proposed Findings of Fact—to the second submitted proposed
12 Findings of Fact.

One regarding the second sentence of

13 paragraph 9 on the Conclusions of Law.

I overruled that

14 objection and agreed to sign that document as submitted.
15

With respect to your second objection, the judgment

16 being granted for $1,925 and then simultaneously satisfied,
17 I'm granting your objection to that and indicating that it
18 does not technically comport with the understanding during the
19 course of the trial.

I note Mr. Gold objects to that but I'm

20 granting your objection and directing that paragraph 2 be so
21 amended.
22

And let me say again, I think I do understand that

23 Mr. Gold would have preferred to have a judgment (inaudible).
24 I would presume that he would prefer to have interest and the
25 penalties that his client may incur past on and also would

14

1 have the $1,925 earn interest since the day it was due.

For

2 whatever equitable powers this Court has in hearing this
3 matter, I simply ruled against that as a matter of equity.
4 Specifically, that both parties really were party to this
5 nonpayment of sales tax initially.

And I just didn't think it

6 was fair and appropriate that Mr. Armstrong bear the burden of
7 that when both parties, with their eyes open, acknowledged
8 that sales tax was not being paid initially.

And, again,

9 that's just a matter of equity and fairness.
10

Again, I guess this is what trials are for, to sort

11 out contesting perspectives and different points of view.
12 Again, I tried to do the best I can for that and so the—and I
13 do believe that the judgment, then, form and Findings of Fact
14 as I've directed those be changed, accurately reflect those.
15 Again, it's not as either of you would have them but I believe
16 the findings and conclusions and judgment form is consistent
17 with the ruling of the Court.

And I have no problem with any

18 of that.
19

Anything else then for the record, Mr. Gold?

20

MR. GOLD:

For the record, I have just delivered to

21 Mr. Armstrong Notice of Entry of Judgment, it being the
22 anticipation that it will be entered this date.

And I would

23 ask the Court to sign—
24

THE COURT:

Yeah, I will sign and enter it today.

If

25 you can be back by 1:00, that will be just great.

15

1

THE COURT:

I'll file the Notice of Entry with the

THE COURT:

Okay.

2 Clerk.
Thank you, Mr. Gold, for that.

Thank you, Mr. Armstrong, and I f m sorry that you all had to
come back a number of times and get this all sorted out.
it is finally done now.

But

Thank you very much, both of you.

(This hearing was concluded.)
* * *
* * *
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6

voice faded

10

couldn't understand him, voice faded

10

paper rattling and noise overriding Mr. Armstrong

13

couldn't understand him

19

talking over each other

P R O C E E D I N G S
2

THE COURT:

This matter is—I can't tell from t h e —

3

THE CLERK:

Which one is that, Judge Livingston?

4

THE COURT:

On the--

5

THE CLERK:

Small claims?

6

THE COURT:

No, on the Concept West Interiors.

7

THE CLERK:

Just a hearing.

8

THE COURT:

Prior to trial.

9

MR. GOLD:

Is this Gillham?

10

THE CLERK:

11

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

12

MR. GOLD:

Yes.

Brent Gold, Your Honor, for the plaintiff

13

in this matter.

14

Mr. Armstrong represents himself in this matter.

15

motion, it's his motion, that's the reason we're here today.

16
17
18

Mr. Armstrong has filed a motion.

THE COURT:

He's filed a

And this is your Motion for Request for

Production of Documents, is this what we're talking about?
MR. ARMSTRONG:

What I filed, Your Honor, was a

19

request for production of documents to them and also a request

20

for a continuance of the trial so I can complete getting the

21 documents and the deposition of Ms. Gillham and some documents
>2 from the state.
!3

MR. GOLD:

This matter is scheduled for trial on

!4 February 10th right now, Your Honor.

And we would oppose his

5 motion and I'd like to be heard on that.

1

THE COURT:

Okay.

Why—golly.

2 some problems, I know, with this.

We're going to have

We're being cut back to two

3 days a month, essentially, in this court.

The problem is—I'm

4 just speaking out loud to you, Mr. Gold, you certainly have a
5 right to file cases in the—wherever the Circuit Court sits.
6 The problem is, there's so few of them that I don't—I can't
7 schedule regular trial days for civil cases and it just
8 becomes really, really awkward.

So, I'm just telling you

9 right up front that I'm going to put a little pressure on you
10 this morning to see if we can resolve this.

If it can't be,

11 I'll—I may have to hear this in Coalville.

How long do you

12 think it would take, the trial?
13

MR. GOLD:

Well, I think that if we try the case, we

14 should be able to do this—I'd like to say half a day.
15 Recently, I don't think I've ever been able to accomplish
16 anything in half a day.

It always runs to a day.

17 be able to do it in half a day.

We ought to

I don't think there would be

18 any more than three or four witnesses called in the matter.
19 But, again, we don't—at this point, I don't know how many
20 witnesses Mr. Armstrong would intend to call.
21

In terms of our position in connection with his

22 motion, this matter has been filed with this Court since
23 August of last year.

And until Mr. Armstrong's documents were

24 filed with the Court approximately the middle part of this
25 month, nothing had been done.

At that point the trial date

1 had been set that spurred his filing of these motions.

And,

2 of course, pursuant to our procedural rules and rules of the
3 Court, his request for discovery less than 30 days prior to
4 trial is inappropriate.
5

I understand he is not represented by counsel. We

6 have letters in the file where he's clearly indicated he's
7 very knowledgeable and you can see from his filings he's been
8 in court before.

The one significant communication we have

9 had with him was where he indicated he's been involved in
10 several litigation amounts, he knows full well the conse11 quences and I don't think he minced any words in emphasizing
12 to my client that this could be very costly and expensive for
13 her if she continued to pursue the matter.

I think now he's

14 evidencing that sort of situation.
15

The matter is set for trial.

He's done nothing in

16 connection with prior preparation for it.

The matter is a

17 relatively simply matter, straightforward contract.
18 which he doesn't have, he ought to have.
19 have, he ought to have.

That

He claims he doesn't

He's had plenty of time to do it and

20 in the interests of justice we'd like to try this matter and
21 be done with it so as to avoid the accumulation of costs and
22 fees that he so well pointed out.
23

THE COURT:

Let's go through just a moment and let

24 Mr. Armstrong say what he wants to about the trial.
25 asking for what—what documents are you specifically

He is

1 requesting?
MR. ARMSTRONG:

2

I'm requesting her records of what

3 services she provided to us, the receipts she provided when
4 she bought the furniture, etc. for our account, her records of
5 communication and documenting what she did for us and didn't
6 do.

I'm also asking for the copies of her returns with the

7 Utah State Tax Commission.
8

THE COURT:

Okay, those are nondiscoverable.

9 going to be real easy.

That's

I'm not going to make her give you a

10 copy of her—you don't get to look at her state tax returns
11 because she claims you owe her money.
12 reason that should be.

That's—there's no

Is that going to be at issue?

You're

13 not going to introduce her tax returns, are you, Mr. Gold?
14

MR. ARMSTRONG:

15 on the purchases.

She's claiming that we owe sales tax

And so the sales tax returns are very

16 valid, Your Honor.
17

MR. GOLD:

18 in question.

There is an issue that may legitimately be

The contract that we're talking about was a

19 contract for furnishings, furniture, fixtures, etc. for
20 Mr. Armstrong's home.

My client is an interior designer.

21 Part of the claim is for sales tax owed to the State of Utah
22 that my client claims that Mr. Armstrong has not paid, all
23 right?
24

As I understand what he's asking for is something -

25 from the State of Utah and from us indicating—evidencing the

sales tax amount.
MR. ARMSTRONG:

2

And the fact that she reported these

3 purchases and that they, in fact, were—and the sales tax, in
4 fact, has (inaudible).
MR. GOLD:

5

And we have absolutely no problem in

6 giving him that information.

We really don't.

We can provide

7 him—
THE COURT:

8
9 presume?

Well, she's a cash basis taxpayer, I

She's not paying sales tax on to the state that she

10 didn't collect, is she?
11

MR. GOLD:

Well, that's part of the problem, I would

12 represent to the Court, is this:

We've informed the State of

13 Utah as—and she is a cash basis, all right?

The State—we

14 informed the State of Utah of this problem, that there is a
15 matter in litigation and that there is money that we believe
16 is owed to the State of Utah in connection with this matter.
17

The State of Utah is fully informed of the matter and

18 they claim to have lien rights as against my client because
19 they claim, notwithstanding her cash basis, that if she hasn't
20 collected from him she should have collected it from him and
21 should have paid it to the State of Utah.
22
23 it?

THE COURT:

Did she pay sales tax when she purchased

Or she—no, she buys it wholesale and doesn't pay sales

24 tax.
25

So, they claim—

MR. GOLD:

She buys it wholesale—

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. GOLD:

And doesn't pay sales tax?
And does not pay sales tax at that point,

3 that's correct.
4

THE COURT:

5

MR. ARMSTRONG:

I see.
Your Honor, she's to report that at

6 the time she purchases it and the time the transactions take
7 place, whether or not we pay—
8

THE COURT:

Whether she does or doesn't, that doesn't

9 have anything to do with whether or not you owe her money,
10 frankly.

I'm not going to turn into this.

I want you to

11 understand right up front, Mr. Armstrong, this trial's going
12 to be very narrow.

And it's on whether or not you in fact owe

13 Concepts West Interiors some money or not.
14 then there's going to be a judgment.
15

And if you do,

If you don't, you don't.

And if you owe her sales tax, whether or not she in

16 fact paid that on to the state, whether she's got a problem
17 with the State Tax Commission or not, that's a matter that I'm
18 not going to be concerned with.
19 I this case.

That's beyond the purview of

The State Tax Commission is a—they're big boys

20 and girls and they can handle it and they can do what they're
21 going to do as far as collecting sales tax.

I don't work for

22 the State Tax Commission, I'm not going to turn this trial
23 into more than it is.
24

So, to the degree that existence of these documents

25 go to the validity of the claim, it's hard for me to imagine

1 how they do or how they don't.
2 entitled to discover them.

But to that degree, you're

Even assuming worst case, and that

3 is that Ms. Gillham, dba Concepts West Interiors, is not
4 paying the sales tax that she is required under law to pay,
5 that is not your concern nor is it the concern of this Court.
6 And that's not going to make any difference whatsoever how I
7 rule in this case.
8

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Your Honor, I beg to differ.

There

9 are certain circumstances where she's obligated to pay the
10 sales tax and there's certain circumstances she's not. And
11 that's a big part of the issue of this case.
THE COURT:

12

Well, let me just say, Mr. Armstrong,

13 whether in fact she owes money to the State of Utah, I don't
14 care about for the purpose of this case.

That has nothing to

15 do what I'm—is it six percent of the amount that you're
16 claiming is sales tax?
MR. GOLD:

17

Is that what you're—

The exact percentage, Your Honor, is

18 probably something in excess of that.

It amounts t o —

L9 originally amounted to approximately $1,900.

And, of course,

»0 the State of Utah is now claiming penalty and interest in
1 connection with it because this is a third quarter '92 matter.
2 That's when the—at least the State of Utah claims it should
J have been paid.
THE COURT:
of it.

I see. Well, let's just get to the heart

Whatever documents you have you'll be willing to

8

1 deliver to Mr. Armstrong; is that correct?
2

MR. GOLD:

Absolutely.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, that answers that one, then.

4 When can they be delivered to him?
I111 have to meet with my client and

MR. GOLD:

5

6 obtain those.

But we can provide those within—not later than

7 a week.
8

THE COURT:

Okay.

9

MR. ARMSTRONG:

So, that answers that—

I also ask for a depo—to be able to

10 depose her.
11

THE COURT:

Well, why did you wait to make a deposi-

12 tion—request a deposition prior to the—until after a trial
13 notice was sent?
L4

MR. ARMSTRONG:

L5 not an attorney.

Okay.

I hate to make an excuse.

I just moved here from California.

I'm

I got

L6 the notice—the request for the trial hearing while I was out
L7 of town and by the time I got back from that trip you'd
L8 already set the trial.
L9

THE COURT:

What information are you attempting to

!0 elicit from Ms. Gillham?
1

MR. ARMSTRONG:

That goes to the heart of the matter,

2 but there are issues about the sales tax and furniture and
3 when she did work for us.
4 that—all those issues.
questions.

And there's disputes over all

And I'd like to ask her those

1

THE COURT:

And the total amount you're claiming is

2 $3,000; is that correct?
3

MR. GOLD:

4 in the complaint.

The total amount, Your Honor, is set forth
It's approximately $3,900. We claim that

5 all of that was owed on or about, I'm estimating, July 31,
6 1992.

It might have been July 1, 1992, plus interest.

We've

7 made an allegation with respect to attorney's fees and bad
8 faith defense in connection with the matter.
9

THE COURT:

Is there any basis for attorney's fees

10 other than the bad faith defense?
11

MR. GOLD:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. GOLD:

14 allegation.

There is no contract—
There's not contract or statute for it?
—that sets forth the requirement, the

Again, we're (inaudible) statutory basis of bad

15 faith (inaudible).
16

THE COURT:

17

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Okay.

Uh—

Your Honor.

I want to say

18 (inaudible) is I've had an interest in resolving this from the
19 beginning, from the first conversation with Ms. Gillham and
20 even today (inaudible).
21

THE COURT:

22 February the 10th.

Okay.

Now, this is set for trial for

I suppose, Mr. Gold, that a pro se

23 defendant really ought not have the rules of procedure—even
24 though he's certainly not the most naive of pro se defendants,
25 based upon the pleadings that I see before m e — ought to have

10

1 some generous application of the rules in terms of time.
2

I will say this, though, Mr. Armstrong.

I'm not

3 certain on a $3,000 claim, essentially, why someone would want
4 to spend a—oh, a third or maybe a fourth, anyway, of the cost
5 of that in terms of taking a deposition._ Other than, I
6 suppose, there is some legitimate—there is some legitimacy to
7 the point that Mr. Gold's making, frankly, that you're just
8 trying to drive up the cost of litigation to force a settle9 ment.

And I guess what I want to say to you is there's a lot

10 that can be accomplished in terms of looking at documents.
11 You can ask Mr. Gold, What's your position on this, Why are
12 you claiming that, that could be handled a lot less expen13 sively for what is essentially a collection matter of $3,000.
14

What I'm saying to you is I'm going to give you the

15 right to—give you the opportunity to exercise your right to
16 take a deposition.

If—I'm going—however, if the plaintiff

17 prevails in this case, number one, and if, number two, there
18 was no substantial information gleaned from that or I'm not
19 able to receive in the course of a trial some information that
20 makes that a legitimate exercise in discovery, I want you to
21 understand that I•m going to award attorney's fees to Mr. Gold
22 for the benefit of his client for the—at least for the cost
23 of the deposition.

May or may not be liable for attorney's

24 fees for the trial and other things, but at least for that
25 four or five hundred dollars or whatever is involved in that

11

1 appearance for deposition if ultimately I determine that
2 simply was not needful or appropriate.
And, again, I just got to say to you, if you had an

3

4 attorney, I don't think an attorney is going to say to you,
5 Let's go depose the plaintiff, unless for some reason Mr. Gold
6 is just—is not very well forthcoming on providing information
7 to you.

Spending the cost for a deposition on a $3,000 claim

8 smells of, smacks of simply trying to needlessly escalate the
9 costs of litigation, number one. And number two, just trying
10 to postpone, unfairly, a trial.
11 J

And I think particularly when—and, again, I say

12 when—if this turns out to be more or less a personal
13 relationship, personal contractual relationship to which you
14 already had know—this involves conversations you've already
15 had—you had, not other people.

If this were a large

16 corporate conglomerate and you talked to someone who's not a
17 party to the action and it's information you really need,
18 that's one thing.

If it's—if you are—if what I end up

L9 hearing at trial the evidence is simply conversations between
0 the two of you, you're already party to those and you don't
1 really need to depose someone to discover what was said.
were a party to those.

You

That's exactly the kind of case that

I'm going to liberally award costs and fees on, if that's why
you're doing it.
I don't know if that helps you at all or if that

12

1 provides any guidance to you.

What I am saying to you is I'm

2 going to grant your motion, even though technically you're not
3 entitled to that, because you're a pro se defendant.

And if

4 you really want the opportunity to depose the plaintiff, I'll
5 let you do that.
6

But I would urge you to think carefully if—why

7 you're really doing that.

If it's really information that

8 you're genuinely seeking, that you can get no other way, and
9 I'm going to let you put the plaintiff to that cost.

But,

10 again, it's an issue I'm going to deal with later at trial.
11

MR. ARMSTRONG:

12

THE COURT:

Can I respond for a second?

Well, I'm not—the rule is you can appeal

13 me but you can't argue with me.

I'm not going to—and I want

14 you to understand that now and at trial, also.

That's not the

15 point of this.
16

MR. ARMSTRONG:

There's a request for admissions and

17 possibly after looking at the documents and seeing their
18 request for admissions that maybe a deposition isn't
19 necessary.

So far this case has not been very amicable or

20 (inaudible) been working together and I have no thought that
21 that would change.
22

MR. GOLD:

Your Honor, in connection with this—the

23 lack of amicability is certainly not between Mr. Armstrong and
24 myself.

I've never talked to him prior to today.

It might be

25 between my client and Mr. Armstrong.

13

THE COURT:

1

Sure, that's why you have lawsuits.

We—

2 hopefully, people don't punch each other out, they hire
3 lawyers.

That's right.
MR. GOLD:

4

5 documents.

He has filed requests for production of

He has filed notice with the-State of Utah for

6 requests for production of documents.
7

THE COURT:

8

MR. GOLD:

9

THE COURT:

10 that.

The State of Utah?

Tax Commission.
Well, they're not going to respond to

You can give them a subpoena, I suppose.

11 respond to that, either.
12

MR. GOLD:

13

MR. ARMSTRONG:

They won't

These are confidential—aren't they?

Exactly.
They would only respond to a court

14 order.
15

THE COURT:

16

MR. GOLD:

And they're not going to get one.
And he mentions admissions.

And he h a s —

17 he has asked for six admissions and those can be summarily
18 given to him.
19 use.

I mean, you know, there's a formal form that we

I'm not going to take 3 0 days to do that.

I'll give him

20 his response to those request for admissions and I can assure
21 him that they're all going to be in the negative to what he's
22 looking for.

But he will have those, as well, within that

23 one-week period of time.
24

Again, in granting his motion, are you saying you're

25 going to continue the trial date?

14

1

THE COURT:

Well, I'm going to ask him—if he wants

2 to take the deposition, I'm going to continue the trial date.
3 But I'm just cautioning him that (a) I'm not sure that is in
4 the—is what you really want to do, given the scope of this
5 case.

And, again, I'm just going to say it's a $3,000 collec-

6 tion case, is what it is. And I'm not going to—I'm not going
7 to allow you just to escalate the cost needlessly for a $3,000
8 case.
9

On the other hand, if it's something you legitimately

10 need to do, then do it.

But you ought to make that decision,

11 understanding that ultimately if the plaintiff prevails in
12 this case and we get to an issue of awarding costs and fees,
13 I'm going to look at what attorney's fees were incurred in bad
14 faith.

And, frankly, compelling a deposition when—if all

15 you're going to ask about are conversations the two of you had
16 with each other you're already a party to, I'm just not—that
17 doesn't even pass the smell test, okay?

And that's something

18 you're very likely to be hit on on some attorney's fees.
19

MR. ARMSTRONG:

I feel, Your Honor, that her filing a

20 lawsuit and hiring an attorney was the same idea—(inaudible)
21 they expected me to hire an attorney and have to pay the
22 expenses.
23

THE COURT:

Okay.

I don't know if Mr.—what has

24 Mr. Gold done that's been unreasonable and that you believe I
25 should award some sanctions?

15

1

MR. ARMSTRONG:

I'm saying, just to bring me into

2 court over this—I tried to resolve it with Ms. Gillham a long
3 time ago—to file a lawsuit against me anticipating that I
4 have to get an attorney is no different than—they're trying
5 to run up costs to force me to settle.
6

THE COURT:

Well, I don't—I'm not going to—I'll

7 help you with that one right now.

And that is I'm not going

8 to rule that filing a lawsuit is, in and of itself, inapprop9 riate, harassment or anything else.
10 for.

That's what trials are

You get your day in court and everyone gets to present

11 their side and I try to listen fairly and impartially the best
12 I can and make the best judgment I can, Mr. Armstrong.
13

But simply because you file—I don't know of many

14 defendants that like the fact they were sued.

I don't think

15 that you're in a particularly unique situation from any other
16 civil defendant.
17

MR. ARMSTRONG:

I just don't see the difference

18 between them causing me attorney's fees and me causing them
19 attorney's fees, why that would be in relation to how you
20 award attorney's fees.
21

THE COURT:

Well, I'm not" going to award you

22 attorney's fees if you didn't incur any, number one.
23 chosen to be pro se.

You've

If in the course of a trial you were to

24 convince me that this action was brought in bad faith, without
25 any legitimate basis, that if your costs were—if Mr. Gold

16

1 required you to take depositions and do things that were
2 simply a waste of time and running up costs, then absolutely,
3 I would consider a motion to award fees back.
4

But that's not what I have before me.

5 plaintiff that brought an action.

I have a

There was no ostensible

6 reason why a deposition should be taken in the case.

And if

7 that proves to be correct, that there was no needful, approp8 riate reason for the deposition, I'm just telling you you're
9 on the hook for the costs of those.
10

If Mr. Gold required something for you to do that

11 incurred a cost that was not needful, it was merely for
12 harass, delay, then absolutely you're going to be looking—
13 you'd be entitled to some sanctions back to him.

The rules

14 apply both ways.
15

MR. ARMSTRONG:

16 actually for the trial.

I contemplated hiring an attorney
Do I still have the right or the

17 ability to do that?
18

THE COURT:

Sure.

You can—you have the right to

19 represent yourself or anyone that you want to have—licensed
20 to practice law in the State of Utah—can appear on your
21 behalf.
22

MR. ARMSTRONG:

23

THE COURT:

Okay, thank you.

There's no problem with that at all.

24 Again, what I want to know is just whether or not you want to
25 take the deposition.

I'm waiving—you're technically too
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1 late.

The trial date was set when you made the request.

2 Because you are a pro se defendant, I'm willing to let you
3 still take the deposition in a late fashion.
4 do that, that's fine.

If you want to

But I want you to understand the—that

5 you're, in one sense, upping the ante by—doing that.
6

MR. ARMSTRONG:

What I would like to do is get some

7 kind of a continuance on the trial, see these documents, get
8 these answers and hopefullv not have the deposition.

But if

9 these—if I don't get—I don't have the documents to review to
10 see if I'm getting all the information that I'd like to have
11 at this point.
12

THE COURT:

Well--

13

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Taking what you've said in mind,

14 trying not to do the deposition.
15

THE COURT:

The problem is—see, once I go into

16 March, I go on this half-day in Park City matter that is going
17 to be really hard.

And February 24th I have two jury trials

18 that I could—Mr. Gold, if this meets with your schedule—I
19 could bump it back one week to Wednesday, the 17th.
20

MR. ARMSTRONG:

21

MR. GOLD:

I'll be out of town that day.

We can accommodate you.

We had two

22 choices of dates, the 10th and the 17th.
23
24 is.

THE COURT:

The 10th and the 17th is really all there

And you can have your choice, also, Mr. Armstrong, of the

25 10th or 17th.

But I'm telling you after then I just—I've
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1 got, again, a jury trial on the 24th and then I'm only here
2 half days and this is a half day civil trial and it would
3 really be extremely difficult to fit that in.
4

MR. ARMSTRONG:

5

MR. GOLD:

Well, I can't do it the 17th.

Your Honor, let me propose this:

6 give him the documents.

We can

If he wants to take his deposition,

7 he can take it before the 10th.
8

THE COURT:

9

MR. GOLD:

Any reason why you couldn't do that?
(Inaudible) everything—I think he's

10 scheduled—at least tentatively, he's got it scheduled for—
11 no, he's scheduled it for March 12th.
12

THE COURT:

Any reason why—why don't you just take

13 the deposition before February 10th?
MR. ARMSTRONG:

14
15 I?
16

Like—

I probably don't have any choice, do

So—
THE COURT:

Well, I mean, you have some input.

17 the choice is mine, that's correct.
18 ultimately.

No,

The choice is mine,

I'm trying to be fair and listen to your

19 concerns, Mr. Gold's concerns, trying to balance—
20

MR. ARMSTRONG:

I asked for the continuance so that

21 I'd have more time to prepare for this.
22 that it was going to be coming that fast.
23 these documents.

I didn•t have an idea
I want to look at

That's why I asked for the continuance.

24 I thought I could get it done, I wouldn't have asked.

If

I can't

25 do it the 17th because I will be out of town.

19

1

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, okay.

So, if we went on the

2 10th, what day could you take the deposition before the 10th?
3

MR. ARMSTRONG:

Uh, what's the Friday before that?

4 When are you going to have the documents to me?
5

MR. GOLD:

We'll have them to you by Wednesday of

6 next week, and hopefully earlier.
7

MR. ARMSTRONG:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. ARMSTRONG:

10

THE COURT:

Well, it would be that Friday, then.

Okay.
If I choose to do it.

And the date for that, then, Mr. Gold,

11 is?
12

MR. GOLD:

13

THE COURT:

Today is the 27th.
And Friday's the 30th.

It would be—is

14 that the 6th of February?
15

MR. GOLD:

16

THE COURT:

So, that would be the 5th of February.
5th of February.

Okay.

Then why don't

17 we—is there any problem, then, with making—with ordering
18 that the plaintiff respond to the discovery in terms of
19 providing documents and providing—for responding to the
20 request for admissions not later than one week from today,
21 which would be February 3rd, at the latest, have that
22 responded, and ordering that if the plaintiff—rather, the
23 defendant chooses to do so, can depose the plaintiff in this
24 case on Friday, February the 5th?
25

Any problem with that?

That meet all of your needs,

20

1 then, Mr. Armstrong?
2

• MR. ARMSTRONG:

Well, honestly no, but I don't see

3 any choices, so, yes.
4

THE COURT:

Okay.

5

MR. ARMSTRONG:

What need doesn't that meet?

It's too fast for me.

6 that's why I asked for a continuance.

You know,

We're still going to

7 trial on the same day and I'm going to have two days to look
8 at the documents.

But, you know, that's what you can do,

9 that's what you can do.
10

THE COURT:

Yeah.

If there were a—and just for the

11 record and so you understand that I know, again, those are
12 choices that you made, I've—I just can't—I've got a criminal
13 jury trial set on the 24th.

All I can do is do what I can

14 with the resources that I have.

And I offered to you the 17t.h

15 as an alternate and that was a choice that you made that
16 you'd—
17

MR. ARMSTRONG:

I have an airline ticket, I will be

18 out of the state.
19

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, I have a criminal jury trial

20 the next week.

And as between you and me, guess who gets to

21 choose?

So, that's the answer to that.

Okay?

But I just

22 want you to know that the fact on the 10th and not the 17th, I
23 mean, that's, again, at least partially a consequence of a
24 choice that you've made, okay?
25

We'll set this matter, then, for—the trial date will

21

1 remain but your motions-—the motion for discovery is granted.
2 The motion to take a deposition is granted but the motion to
3 continue the trial date is denied.
4

(This hearing was concluded.)

5

* * *

6

* * *

7

* * *

8

* * *

9

* * *

10

* * *

11

* * *

12

* * *

13

* * *

14

* * *

15

* * *

16

* * *

17

* * *

18

* * *

19

* * *

20

Thank you.

* * *

21

* * *

22

* * *

23

* * *

24

* * *

25

* * *
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

This is the time set for trial in the

3 matter of Yvonne Gillham, doing business as Concepts Interiors
4 versus Donald E. Armstrong.

The record should reflect that

5 the plaintiff is present personally before the Court today,
6 represented by her attorney, Mr. Brent A. Gold.
7 is appearing pro se in this matter.

The defendant

Mr. Donald E. Armstrong

8 is also present.
9

Are there any matters preliminarily, either Mr. Gold

10 or Mr. Armstrong, before we start the trial?
11

MR. GOLD:

The only matter I can think of, Your

12 Honor, is related to your convenience.
13

THE COURT:

14

MR. GOLD:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. GOLD:

Oh, we'll just suck it up.

We're okay.

Are you all right.
Yeah, we'll be fine.
If you'd like to take some time for lunch

17 or something.
18

THE COURT:

No, no.

19 running to get some things.
20 you, though.

In fact, we have—I had a clerk
We'll be okay.

That's kind of

Thank you, Mr. Gold.

21

Anything preliminarily, Mr. Armstrong?

22

MR. ARMSTRONG:

23

THE COURT:

No.

Okay.

Why don't you go ahead, then,

24 and—do we need to have opening statements or do you want to
25 call your first witness?

1

THE COURT:

I'll be in recess just very briefly.

2

(A recess was taken.)

3

(When tape starts again, it begins in progress with

4 another witness who later is identified as Susan St. James.)
DIRECT EXAMINATION (IN PROGRESS)

5

6 BY MR. ARMSTRONG:
7

A

And so I went through another designer to get that.

8

Q

This is after March of '92; is that correct?

9

A

Uh-huh.
THE COURT:

10

You went directly to the vendor and not

11 through the plaintiff?
THE WITNESS:

12

I went through the vendor and then

13 through another designer.
THE COURT:

14

You had to have another designer because

15 that vendor only sold to designers; is that correct?
THE WITNESS: Yes.

16
17

Q

Now, were you the one that handled roost of t h e —

18 going over these bills that Yvonne gave us and tried to make
19 sense of them?
20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Did I give you that set of documents?

22

A

You've given me a set of invoices and purchase orders

23 and copies of checks.
24

Q

Okay.

The first calls for money we got from Yvonne

25 were sometime in 1991; is that correct?

30

